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“I’m very disappointed in this meeting. You talk about a lot of things: mental health, farming, 
sewers… But the main thing a lot of people come out here to hear about is reimbursement…You 
talk about mental health, which is a result of the trauma that a lot of us experienced during the 
hurricane, but you can’t disregard the stress this issue has caused us… that’s what people want 
to talk about!... It’s a big issue. You could address it for five minutes, ten minutes. Instead, you 
just ignore it.” 
 
More than 200 residents packed themselves into the stuffy auditorium of Canarsie’s 
Hebrew Educational Society in mid-July for the first of four planned public engagement 
meetings for New York Rising, the state government-led project to form post-disaster 
reconstruction plans for 124 localities around the state, and as the meeting wore on tensions 
mounted between meeting organizers and angry residents. The above quote comes from a man 
who rose towards the tail end of the meeting. Overpowering numerous interruptions (“this is not 
the forum for that!” “this money was given for a specific reason!”) from those running the 
meeting and segments of the audience, he chided organizers for the meeting’s agenda, which 
explicitly excluded discussion of reimbursement for residents. It was a familiar scene to me as I 
spent the summer of 2014 touring public meetings in Canarsie and surrounding neighborhoods of 
Brooklyn which were ‘recovering’ from Hurricane Sandy since the storm hit in late October 
2012. While residents were eager to discuss compensation and reimbursement at public 
meetings, meeting organizers routinely attempted to redirect issues to their own selected topic of 
choice: resilience.  
In the past several decades resilience has become a prolific discourse used by actors in 
government and NGOs in the context of disastrous climate events. However, different actors 
formulate different conceptions of the meaning of resilience, and the term remains open and 
contested. Accompanying the varied understandings of resilience, recovery groups and programs 
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make use of certain techniques (discursive strategies, methods of classification, participatory 
modes of governance, and regimes of accounting and calculation) to strategically govern 
residents’ practices.  
To better understand how resilience was constructed and propagated by actors in 
Canarsie, I utilize Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality to provide an analytical 
framework that “is especially useful toward connecting abstract societal discourses with 
everyday material practices” (Ettlinger 2011). Governmentality refers to an ensemble formed by 
institutions, procedures, strategies and tactics that allow for the calculated exercise of specific 
forms of power on target populations through the “political economy of a will to knowledge” 
(Foucault 1998). Techniques of governance work by engaging the relation between the various 
societal mentalities that may simultaneously exist in the social nexus and the material practices 
of people’s everyday lives (Foucault 2000b). In Canarsie, programs and organizations deploy 
techniques to strategically govern residents’ recovery practices. These techniques typically 
embody neoliberal tropes, individualizing costs and casting resilience as a technical problem to 
be solved through calculable solutions. As an epistemological approach, governmentality helps 
interpret and explain how forms of governance are normalized and legitimized for those enrolled 
in them. The governance of disaster recovery in Canarsie has been rationalized through the 
increasingly prevalent societal mentality that the solution to problems of human/environment 
relations lies in resilience that must be developed, known, calculated, and constructed. I sketch 
the techniques Canarsie recovery actors (programs, organizations, and policies) use to ground 




Governmentality is useful for research on disaster and climate governance because it is 
conducive to recognizing the multiplicity of actors that participate in governance. There has been 
a tendency in disaster recovery literature to over-emphasize the role of specific actors such as the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an underfunded government agency unable 
meet its goals without substantial partnerships with, or assistance from, the private and non-
governmental sectors. Following Braun’s (2014) conceptualization of resilient governance 
occurring through an assemblage (dispositif) containing a dizzying variety of practices, 
institutions, discourses, mentalities, and funding mechanisms, I analyze Canarsie’s recovery as 
being governed by a multiplicity of actors.  
Different recovery actors articulate resilience in varied ways, prompting differing 
strategies for governing resident recoveries. NY Rising approaches resilience as an infrastructure 
problem, while the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) associates it with individual 
homeowners’ adaptations to risks. Different recovery actors develop different techniques of 
resilience for governing resident practices in accordance with their understandings of resilience. 
Canarsie disaster recovery occurs through an assemblage of actors, each of whom produces their 
own resilient governmentalities. Analyzing disaster recovery as simultaneously governed by 
multiple governmentalities provides space for thinking about disaster recovery as being 
constituted by entangled and at times incoherent perspectives and strategies. As recovery actors 
distribute recovery funds, they simultaneously produce and spread knowledge about what 
constitutes resilient and fundable spaces.  Recovery groups within and outside of the government 
become crucial nodes of power in the context of individualized disaster costs that few people 
have the spare savings to meet. Need exceeds supply of recovery funding, necessitating groups’ 
use of techniques to strategically govern the distribution of funds. These techniques often involve 
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classificatory schemes bound up in neoliberal discourses of deservingness, sustainability, and 
resilience. NY Rising’s classificatory schemes revolve around cost/benefit analyses, which direct 
funds towards critical urban infrastructure. Meanwhile, city housing recovery program Build It 
Back’s funding mechanisms quickly fulfilled multimillion dollar deals with inexperienced 
outside contractors, simultaneously failing to begin servicing its 20,000 resident housing 
recovery funding waitlist for nearly 18 months. Viewing recovery actors as each participating in 
their own resilient governmentalities helps interpret how individualized costs have been 
distributed to residents, and through what techniques.  
Although Canarsie was not my initial planned neighborhood of study, I became drawn to 
it by the sense that it was a space of disconnect between the recovery assemblage and the needs 
of residents, a sense underscored by it being a constant source of debate and controversy 
amongst recovery organizers throughout the city. I knew before arriving that Canarsie had been 
targeted by subprime lenders more than any other neighborhood in New York City during the 
2000s, that “the pre-event trajectory of a community’s economic vitality and quality of life 
almost always continues in the aftermath of a disaster,” and that by six months after the storm, 
10% of 1-4 family units in Canarsie were in foreclosure (Mooney 2008, Cutter and Emrich 
2006). What I did not know was that some Canarsie residents caused major controversy in the 
recovery assemblage by improperly using charitable funds designated for portions of their houses 
(basements) that recovery groups had deemed unsustainable, unresilient, and unfundable. I cast 
these emergent, unexpected resident recovery strategies as counter-resilient practices, and 
portray these practices as understandable and rational while arguing that their unexpectedness 
emerged from gaps in knowledge and understanding between the groups and programs 
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encompassing the recovery assemblage and local residents. Further, I ask: did differing 
understandings and associated techniques of resilience cohere, or produce perverse effects? 
Below I summarize my research methods, and subsequently I draw from critical 
scholarship to situate Canarsie’s disaster recovery assemblage within broader neoliberal 
mentalities of governance. Next, I position my research within the dense existing scholarship on 
governance through resilience, differentiating my project both from mainstream and critical 
accounts. I find that the former depoliticizes and normalizes resilience as a technique of 
governance, while the latter lacks examination of the practices of newly-formed resilient subjects 
and implicitly presents resilience as “working.” I discuss the results of my field research by 
interweaving a governmentality analysis of the exclusionary mechanisms utilized to govern 
recovery with a narrative account of the first NY Rising public meeting in Canarsie. My aim is to 
explain the perpetually porous and imperfect nature of projects of climate-related governance 
with reference to the contingent constructions and practices of resilience in ways that allow us to 
see residents not as victims, but as agents navigating a risk-filled urban environment in 
entrepreneurial and emergent ways. 
 
Research Methods 
This study is based upon two months of field research in Canarsie, Brooklyn in summer 
2014. I utilized two methods: semi-structured one-on-one interviews with residents in churches, 
town halls, parks, office spaces and private residences, as well as participant observation at town 
halls, public meetings, as well as closed meetings of recovery organizers.
1
 I used the snowballing 
interview technique for sampling, by which I identified gatekeepers both in the neighborhood 
                                                             
1 Approved by the Institutional Review Board, Protocol #2014E0158. All interview subjects have 
been given pseudonyms. 
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and in the recovery assemblage who introduced me to a range of other voices within their 
respective communities. This paper draws upon over 20 interviews with actors in the recovery 
process, including Canarsie residents; volunteers and leaders from local congregations and Faith-
Based Organizations (FBOs); public officials; and volunteers and leaders of local Community-
Based Organizations (CBOs), including board members of the Brooklyn Long-Term Recovery 
Group. I remain in contact with many of my interviewees, and consider this work a result of my 
ongoing discussions with those in the community. 
I arrived in Brooklyn with several neighborhoods in mind for potential study, anticipating 
that within a few days of fieldwork one site would emerge as being both intriguing to me and 
ripe for research material. As briefly indicated above, Canarsie quickly won my heart and 
attention. Punctuated on its southeast border by the calm Canarsie Pier overlooking Jamaica Bay, 
the neighborhood of Canarsie appears as its own pier jutting out of the southeast border of 
Brooklyn. Up against the coast of Jamaica Bay and flanked on its southwest and northeast sides 
by Paerdegat Basin and Fresh Creek respectively, the neighborhood fits mainstream 
understandings of vulnerability to flooding and climate-related sea-level rises (Center for NYC 
Neighborhoods 2013, Cutter and Emrich 2006). Several phenomena in Canarsie also fit common 
understandings of social vulnerability: Canarsie has a substantial minority population (85% black 
with many families having roots in the Caribbean, especially Haiti), and limited connection to 
the denser urban core (just one subway station and line connect Canarsie to the rest of the city, 
and buses to and from Canarsie are routinely overcrowded). Further, it lacks substantial tourist or 
retail attractions, and was in the midst of a housing crisis on the eve of the storm, having been 
targeted by subprime lenders more than any other neighborhood in the city during the 2000s 
(Center for NY Neighborhoods 2013, U.S. Census 2010, Mooney 2008). One representative with 
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a local recovery organization explained, “in a subprime hotspot like Canarsie, many people are 
paying half of their income to meet their mortgage payments” (interview with ‘Martin’). This 
leaves residents at extreme risk of foreclosure in the case of the loss of a job or the need to seek 
medical care, not to mention the repair costs from a disaster. Locals stressed that Canarsie was 
already ailing on the eve of the storm, and that Sandy effectively took a pre-existing foreclosure 
crisis in the neighborhood and “kicked it into overdrive” (interview with ‘Emily’). That Canarsie 
stands at the intersection of mainstream understandings of physical and social vulnerability and 
faces unique challenges, such as a pre-storm foreclosure crisis driven by the impacts of subprime 
lending, makes it an excellent space to examine both the effects of the pre-Sandy context and the 
governance of resilience with reference to the recovery assemblage and local residents.  
Although my appearance as a young white male made me an outlier in Canarsie, my 
status as a clear outsider was helpful to my research more often than not. One successful research 
strategy I stumbled upon was to bring my laundry to Canarsie laundromats, where I was 
regularly approached by residents who recognized me as an outsider and were curious as to what 
brought me there. Quite often residents I spoke with were enthusiastic about my research and 
more than willing to share their stories or connect me with friends and relatives similarly 
affected by the storm, and I am deeply indebted to all the residents of Canarsie who 
enthusiastically welcomed me into their communities and homes and helped to make my 
experience meaningful. 
 
Positioning Disaster Recovery within Neoliberalism 
Projects of governance are intrinsically linked to societal mentalities and regimes of truth, 
which are grounded into material practices by techniques of power (Foucault 2000a). I begin my 
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analysis of Canarsie by situating disaster recovery within the broad regimes of truth known to 
scholars as neoliberalism, a constantly evolving bundle of governmentalities that produce and 
engineer competition in the marketplace, working to see the market pervade all aspects of the 
social fabric (Foucault 2008). Crucially, neoliberal governmentality impacts the actions both of 
residents and the many actors involved in recovery work. Interviews revealed that disaster 
recovery organizers often are surprised by the extent to which they are “left to do the heavy-
lifting” in residential recovery (Interview with ‘Emily’). The diverse apparatus of community-
based and faith-based organizations that is responsibilized with the recovery inevitably lacks the 
resources to meet the needs of residents. The limited recovery funding prompts entrepreneurial 
behavior from the variety of groups who enter into quasi-competition with each other for funding 
and the financial viability of their organizations. To one experienced recovery organizer, this 
situation often leads to “the careless waste of recovery funding” through the “hubris and 
ignorance” of those who become distracted from recovery work while desperately trying to 
obtain the necessary funds to keep their organization running (Interview with ‘Don’.) It is in this 
context that organizers’ most pressing concern was fraud: “all it takes is a couple of instances of 
fraud, even minor fraud, to make everybody skittish about spending their charitable dollars” 
(Interview with ‘Martin’). 
The actions of recovery organizations and workers are conditioned by the sense that they 
are on their own; very much the result of the neoliberal “frugal government,” in which the 
central government, ‘the state,’ performs actions and disperses funds based on a calculation of 
how little the state can reasonably provide while maintaining its goals of active production and 
competition through the marketplace (Foucault 2008). Neoliberal disaster recovery thus focuses 
primarily on the maintenance of critical infrastructure while leaving residents to recover 
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themselves. This frugality engenders a devolution of responsibility, in which citizens are told 
they are responsible for their own material conditions and the possibility of changing them. This 
transference is legitimized through a ‘politics of individualization,’ in which individuals and 
organizations are pitted against each other, which according to market logic should lead to the 
most socially optimal outcome (Lazzarato 2009). It is within this context that it is possible to 
understand a system that devolves the costs of a disaster to individuals without the requisite 
resources to achieve ‘recovery.’  
Although the individualization of costs after disasters might initially appear an intensely 
political issue, fundamental to the neoliberal project is the casting of governance as apolitical and 
increasingly tied up in more ‘technical’ methods of governing, typically involving calculative 
regimes of accounting and financial management (Rose 1993). Residents contested this 
depoliticization using town hall meetings and events by local politicians to confront the 
capricious and supposedly apolitical disaster recovery programs to which they were subjected. 
The politics of individualization and enterprise society that are key characteristics of 
neoliberalism connect with the mentality of homeownership in the United States whereby the 
house is understood as a site of investment and the most important asset most Americans will 
ever own (Hanan 2010). Many federal programs throughout the past century aimed at 
encouraging U.S. homeownership, perhaps most prolific among them being the mortgage-
interest tax deduction. As one community organizer said, “The dream of homeowning, I don’t 
know if it’s hard-wired into the American psyche, but it’s certainly much-touted on both sides of 
the political aisle” (interview with ‘Martin’). Homeownership as a societal mandate contributed 
to the construction of Canarsie’s subprime crisis, and has continued to pervade resident decisions 
regarding the repair of their basements and attempts to salvage their mortgages. 
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The shift in neoliberal governance away from social insurance to a kind of privatization 
of risk management has been dubbed ‘prudentialism,’ in which citizens add to their obligations 
“the need to adopt calculative and prudent personal relations to risk and danger” (O’Malley 
1992). The neoliberal principle of economic-centric solutions to societal ills is well illustrated by 
the example of the NFIP. Created in 1968 after decades of debate following private flood 
insurers retreating from the market after the 1927 Mississippi River Flood, the NFIP has become 
one of the main tools at the disposal of the federal government for attempting to regulate 
citizens’ exposure to flooding (Knowles and Kunreuther 2014). Those enrolled in the program 
pay monthly premiums based on highly technical calculations of flood risk conducted through 
Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs). While the updating of these flood maps provides the 
program with its technical underpinning, in typical frugal government fashion, the costly 
floodplain mapping has been badly underfunded and deferred over the years (Knowles and 
Kunreuther 2014).  
Understanding disaster recovery as embedded within neoliberal governmentality provides 
numerous insights into the formation of resilient subjects in Canarsie. First, we see that both 
residents and disaster organizers are integrated into an enterprise society, which mediates their 
actions with reference to economic rationales such as resilience, sustainability, or in the case of 
organizers the need to ‘compete’ with other groups for limited recovery funds. Fundamental 
characteristics of neoliberalism such as frugal government, the devolution of responsibility this 
entails, and the politics of individualization that legitimizes it, condition much of what occurs in 
disaster recovery. Prudentialism underscores the federal government’s most comprehensive 
efforts to confront these issues through the NFIP, which in typical neoliberal fashion is 
calculative and, following Rose (1993), therefore depoliticized. These underpinnings of 
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neoliberalism have pervasive effects that shape the trajectory of recovery and the need for it, 
from the culture of individualized homeownership to the neoliberal preoccupation with 
discourses of participation observed by Ellis (2012). Beyond the constitution of disaster recovery 
in Canarsie, I turn now to the scholarship that surrounds resilience to better position the 
discourses that communicate the values embedded in recovery efforts. 
 
Positioning in Resilience Scholarship 
Scholarship on resilience has exploded in the past decade, becoming one of the most 
prolific discourses on climate change and natural disasters. However, as Brown (2014) asserted, 
this emerging field encompasses a multiplicity of voices contesting and constructing resilience in 
different ways. Normative approaches have attempted to quantify economic resilience, 
understood as the speed at which an entity or system recovers from a severe shock to its desired 
state (Rose 2007). Within this framework, resilience appears as a neoliberal discourse from the 
outset, emphasizing the retention of productivity and functionality. Assessing social vulnerability 
and resilience in coastal areas of the U.S, Cutter and Emrich (2006) define resilience as the 
ability of a given social group to “adequately recover” from the impacts of hazards. They 
position resilience and vulnerability as largely the products of social inequalities, raising 
questions about the future of coastal counties that have grown more populous, racially and 
ethnically diverse in the past decades. 
Scholars have stressed the importance of taking into account socioeconomic factors when 
identifying vulnerable areas, showing how recent disasters reproduce inequalities, and raising 
pertinent questions regarding who will pay for adaptation measures in a world of human-driven 
climate change (Lecihenko and Thomas 2012, Peck 2006, Reid 2013, Cutter and Emrich 2006). 
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A substantial scholarship across multiple disciplines uses a ‘managerial approach’ and an 
aspiration to scientific language in attempting to anticipate, plan for, and develop governing 
techniques for restructuring life around climate issues, a process that often involves the use of 
resilience as a discursive tool (Brassett and Vaughn-Williams 2013). These mainstream 
approaches to resilience provide insights into shortcomings in existing disaster recovery and 
climate governance, but they often problematically assert an unexamined and universal 
ontological basis for resilience. In contrast, Leichenko (2011) emphasizes that the term is 
contested, arguing that in order to ensure the concept retains its utility there must be “continued 
questioning of how the concept is used and applied to urban areas.” The purpose, then, is to 
ensure that as resilience becomes intertwined with climatized development, “it fosters positive 
social change while contributing to long-term sustainability” (Leichenko 2011).  
Taking up the call for further critical evaluation of the concept of resilience, scholars 
have examined the power relations bound up in the production and dispersal of the discourse. 
MacKinnon and Derickson (2012) argue that the mobilizing discourse of resilience naturalizes 
the ecologically dominant system of global capitalism by placing the onus on local actors to 
adapt to “the logics and implications of global capitalism and climate change,” thoroughly 
implicating resilience in the hegemonic modes of thought that support global capitalism. 
Development and security studies have seen an explosion of literature about resilience in past 
decades that critiques positive ‘managerial’ studies through Foucauldian approaches to show 
how resilience produces a ‘politically-debased’ form of neoliberal subjectivity that secures 
neoliberal governmentality” (Brassett and Vaughn-Williams 2015). Pugh (2014) positions 
resilience as a form of power that works on populations to create resilient subjects who 
understand that risks and hazards and dangers are a permanent feature of life. Evans and Reid 
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(2014) concur, finding that the resilient subject “is required to accept the dangerousness of the 
world it lives in as a condition for partaking of that world and accept the necessity of the 
injunction to change itself in correspondence with threats now presupposed as endemic and 
unavoidable.” These authors see resilience as a biopolitical project masquerading as apolitical, 
deliberately disabling “the political habits, tendencies, and capacities of peoples and replacing 
them with adaptive ones.”  They raise the important question of how to measure the success of 
resilience, asking whether we should celebrate the vulnerable subject who fulfills its neoliberal 
potential, or the subject who moves to combat the system that seeks to render them resilient as 
such. To these authors, resilience is ultimately a program of social compliance rather than “a 
political ambition to transform the very sources of inequality and injustices experienced by 
marginalized populations.” 
Few have placed as much theoretical emphasis on resilience as an emerging mode of 
governing populations as Braun (2014), for whom governing through resilience has entailed the 
incorporation of ‘natural processes’ as part of the critical infrastructure of urban life; 
emphasizing the historicity and contingency of how life is administered today, he concludes that 
“resilience is the name for our contemporary form of biopolitics.” Usefully, in contrast to critical 
scholars who portray resilience as a program of governance being imposed upon populations 
who lack the agency to resist, Braun (2014) leaves open the possibility of alternate climate 
futures arising from the “micro-politics of struggle” within communities in which this new 
management of life is taking place, one which holds the possibility of reforming such 
assemblages away from sustaining the very social orders that causes the problems it purports to 
solve. Evidence of such a micro-politics of struggle can be found in Grove (2014), whose 
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research on disaster management in Jamaica showed that everyday life undermined neoliberal 
programming in ways that draw out the possibilities for political contestation and resistance. 
My aim is to ground the aforementioned conceptual tools in a case study to show how the 
disaster recovery assemblage in Canarsie ‘manages life’ in the wake of disaster, and the ways in 
which the micro-politics of struggle shape, resist, and reshape the trajectory of recovery. Brassett 
and Vaughn-Williams (2015) have critiqued governmentality approaches to resilience for 
committing the same methodological error as managerial approaches to resilience by 
problematically accepting that resilience ‘works.’ Rather, they stress the role of ambiguity, 
indeterminacy, and contingency in attempts to govern via discourses and practices of resilience. 
Seeking to “recover the performative politics of resilience as a series of attempted closures, 
which are always already in excess of their own logic, and give rise to unexpected, unforeseen, 
and disruptive effects,” these authors aim “to repoliticize the otherwise technocratic nature of 
resilient knowledge and its effects” (Brassett and Vaughn-Williams 2015). 
Although Brassett and Vaughn-Williams’ (2015) critique identifies crucial shortcomings 
in existing governmentality studies of resilience, I suggest that these problems emerge not from 
the conceptual lens itself but from misapplications of the tools of governmentality. Issues of 
scale are crucial when pursuing a governmentality study; Foucault (1980) calls for an “ascending 
analysis” that begins by identifying the regimes of practices occurring at the microscale of 
analysis, and works from there to connect these practices with organizations, institutions, and 
broader societal mentalities. Analyzing the macro-scale construction and dispersal of resilience 
without investigating how resilient governmentality has impacted practices at the micro-level 
entails conducting the type of descending analysis against which Foucault warned. Conducting a 
governmentality study through ascending analysis leaves room for consideration of how 
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“practices can diverge from prescribed norms,” with there being “no presumption of 
effectiveness of a technique of power” (Ettlinger 2011). Investigating the micro-scale of analysis 
for regimes of practices rather than assuming that techniques of governance produce their 
intended practices is crucial for understanding the multiplicity of contingencies that pervade the 
disaster recovery apparatus and the unanticipated resident practices in Canarsie. 
In the following section I interweave a brief account of the public engagement meeting 
from which the opening quote in this paper was obtained with analysis of the meeting as a 
participatory technique of governance being used in Canarsie to produce resilient subjects. 
Brassett and Vaughn-Williams (2015) indicate that sites like NY Rising are worth investigation 
because they show “how the resilience agenda seeks to encompass (and apparently unite) the 
governance and protection of material infrastructure, human subjects, and their interrelation.” 
My intention is to not assume that resilience “works,” but rather to critically deconstruct the 
interrelations between resilience as a discourse and as practiced to grasp the contingencies 
embedded in resilient governmentalities.  
Brassett and Vaughn-Williams’ (2015) call for scholars to investigate “whether resilience 
always does and means the same thing across different contexts” suggests that building resilience 
is an inherently spatial process that unfolds unevenly in its attempts to create and govern 
resilient spaces and resilient subjects. To extend these authors’ insights through an analysis of 
the uneven construction of resilient subjects and spaces, I take inspiration from Roy’s (2009) 
work on civic governmentality in Mumbai and Beirut. Studying NGO work with slum 
redevelopment, Roy (2009) found that NGOs serve as forms of government and produce 
governable spaces and subjects, and their associated regimes of participation and inclusion 
produce a distinctive political subjectivity. By examining the relationship between governmental 
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regimes of inclusion and the production of space, Roy (2009) concludes that “there is a great 
deal to be learned about power and authority by studying how subjects and power come to be 
‘inside’ the project of citizenship.” In Canarsie we can learn a great deal by understanding the 
politics of inclusion associated with the recovery; however, rather than questioning who is 
included in the project of citizenship, in the case of Canarsie we must ask: what spaces and 
subjects are included in the project of resilience? Using the framework of civic governmentality, 
Ellis (2012) indicated that public consultations are techniques of governance with “wide appeal 
because they tap into a more pervasive discourse about participation… participation is a key 
trope of neoliberal rationale of governance.” Using the following vignette of the NY Rising 
public engagement meeting I identify the techniques NY Rising and other Canarsie recovery 
actors use to manage inclusion.  
 
Participatory Disaster Recovery in Canarsie, and Regimes of Exclusion 
In this section, I interweave analysis of the participatory techniques used in Canarsie with 
an abbreviated narrative account of the first of four planned Canarsie public engagement 
meetings for the NY Rising program, which I attended in July 2014. While participation is a 
pervasive feature of neoliberal governance, it represents such a broad array of governing 
practices that the term’s meaning is contested (Huxley 2013). Further, participatory schemes 
often promise inclusion and empowerment while achieving neither. I identify participation as a 
technique groups like NY Rising use to govern the politics of inclusion.  NY Rising organizers 
used participatory exercises to engage the discourse of inclusiveness, yet in practice the form of 
the exercises produced inclusion and exclusion simultaneously. While NY Rising engages the 
mentality of inclusive governance through participatory schemes, other groups have constructed 
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their own regimes of in/exclusion.  I analyze how regimes of inclusion have been constituted by 
different recovery actors in Canarsie, and how this has been connected to their particular 
constructions of ‘resilience.’. 
 
Residents filed into the auditorium of Canarsie’s Hebrew Educational Society for 
Canarsie’s first public engagement meeting and were greeted by well-dressed members of the 
Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery (GOSR) and Canarsie’s NY Rising planning committee. 
The enthusiastic organizers passed out information packets. The accompanying packets offered a 
brief overview of the program, which is a $650 million initiative started by the New York state 
government in April 2013. The packets brag that NY Rising “is a unique combination of bottom-
up community preparation and State-provided technical expertise.” One states the goals as 
empowering the most impacted communities in the state “to develop thorough and 
implementable reconstruction plans to build physically, socially, and economically resilient and 
sustainable communities” and to rebuild “in a way that will mitigate against future risks and 
build increased resilience.” The packets assured residents that “all New Yorkers will benefit 
from added resilience. Added resilience means less storm damage in the future, saving lives and 
taxpayer dollars needed for emergency response.” Throughout the opening presentation, 
organizers emphasized that it was crucial they “use their time at this meeting to form a plan for 
improving community resiliency.” Everyone was encouraged to get involved in the process now, 
“or don’t complain when things are put in place.” 
 
 
This account of the first NY Rising Public Engagement meeting provides insights into the 
techniques of governing recovery in post-Sandy Canarsie. The technique of governing by 
participation has become a taken-for-granted aspect of neoliberal governance (Ellis 2012, Huxley 
2013). Participation is open to a number of meanings and implementations, making it a flexible 
technique of governance for engaging mentalities regarding the need for governance to appear 
inclusive and democratic (Huxley 2013). Despite optimism about the potential for resident 
participation in the governance disaster preparedness (van Aalst 2008), Cornwall (2008) notes 
that regimes of participation commonly exclude people: especially vulnerable are those who 
have to work, have small children, or otherwise are unable to justify large chunks of time spent 
outside the house. The discourse of inclusiveness obfuscates the ways that inclusion and the 
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empowerment of certain perspectives and voices are mutually constituted with the exclusion and 
marginalization of others. Although participatory regimes typically privilege urban planners and 
experts, the results of these schemes are often portrayed discursively by program organizers as 
the products of the wishes of the very residents of the targeted community. Throughout the NY 
Rising public meeting organizers encouraged the public to “take ownership of the process” and 
remain highly involved “or don’t complain when things are in place,” pre-empting the eventual 
dissatisfaction that might arise towards the chosen projects and legitimizing the democratic and 
inclusive nature of the program. Participatory governance in NY Rising became a means by 
which to govern inclusion and exclusion. 
Build It Back’s organizers discursively framed the program’s regimes of inclusion as 
empowering low-income residents to recover and ‘rebuild better,’ leaving them more ‘resilient’ 
(in a home that was less physically vulnerable) when the next storm arrives. However, in practice 
Build It Back’s registration and communication mechanisms governed inclusion by providing 
few resources for non-English speakers, while the application process was sufficiently onerous to 
exclude many elderly residents and recent immigrants. Further, miscommunication of policies 
led many renters to only discover that they were eligible for Build It Back after the registration 
had closed (Make the Road New York 2014). In the context of scarce recovery funds, many 
groups based their in/exclusions of residents on assumptions about other recovery programs. For 
example, many FBO and CBO housing recovery groups excluded residents who were already on 
Build It Back’s waitlist to avoid a duplication of recovery funding.  Frugal neoliberal mentalities 
strategically governed these groups’ respective regimes of inclusion.  
 
At the meeting’s outset, an organizer set out what was at stake: $11.9 million had been 
awarded to Canarsie through CDBG-DR. Public engagement meetings “held after each 
important milestone of the planning process” would help form a community-specific 
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reconstruction plan to serve as a “roadmap for building the community’s resilience.” Canarsie’s 
planning committee sends its final proposals to the GOSR. The GOSR has the final say in 
selecting and implementing projects for improving communities’ resilience, with its project 
funding criteria including cost-benefit analyses, feasibility, and “the effectiveness of each project 
in reducing risk to populations and critical assets.”  
Members of the public spent a half-hour taking part in ‘needs and opportunities,’ 
‘community vision’ and ‘asset-mapping’ exercises. These exercises consisted of discussion about 
resilience with meeting organizers who patrolled poster boards on either side of the room. The 
poster boards highlighted potential infrastructure improvement projects, asked residents about 
their vision for the neighborhood, and provided maps of Canarsie with visualizations of flood 
risks, housing assets, infrastructure, and economic assets.   
Following the feedback exercises, participants were encouraged to return to their seats 
so members of Canarsie’s planning committee and the GOSR took turns ‘summarizing and 
responding’ to feedback. Common themes included the revitalization of Canarsie pier, more 
police and security cameras in the neighborhood, attracting ‘trendier’ businesses, adding a 
farmer’s market and mental health facility, expanding access to solar panel technology, and 
improving the neighborhood’s sewage system. Residents raised concerns about the lack of a 
place to go in the case of disasterand pushed for expanded transportation options such as a tram 
or ferry system, but these options were dismissed as too costly. Organizers instead emphasized 
building a disaster relief center in the community to provide a centralized place for those in the 
neighborhood to go and access resources. A woman from the audience interrupted this proposal 
to emphasize alternative transportation options, saying “I think it’s something that really needs 
to be considered and addressed, because it’s just something- you have to think about the weeks 
we were home not able to get to our jobs, if somebody fell ill how could we get to hospitals? It’s 
a very dire situation.” The woman’s comments drew support from the audience, prompting the 
GOSR’s regional lead to take the microphone and assure her that “it’s a great idea we’ll 
consider through the process,” hurriedly moving on to the next speaker. The organizers’ 
attempts to cut off ‘participant interruptions’ and keep the meeting’s agenda moving grew more 
assertive as the meeting drew on. One committee member began his talk by asking people “not 
to stand up and scream like that,” concluding by saying “we’re not here to be stuck in the past, 
we’re here to move forward. And as we move forward, the past will slowly fix itself.” 
 
 
While the NY Rising program’s participatory exercises reflected discourses of 
inclusiveness and empowerment, this examination of participation in practice shows how the 
form of participation, which is determined not by the participants but rather by the facilitators of 
the participatory exercise, precipitates the results of participation. NY Rising’s particular 
resilient governmentality employs participatory exercises as distinct techniques of managing 
inclusion. While NY Rising discursively portrays its funding decisions as constituted by the 
results of participatory exercises, in practice this process is reversed. The program connects its 
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neoliberal mentalities of frugal governance to its practices of building infrastructure through 
regimes of accounting and calculation that abide by market logics, such as cost-benefit analyses 
of proposed projects. Projects that Canarsie residents ‘decide upon’ are sent to the GOSR for 
evaluation, but there is no guarantee of implementation. The GOSR’s evaluative schemes of 
cost-benefit and feasibility analyses are far more empowered decision-makers in the NY Rising 
planning structure than the participatory residents. Throughout the process, plans would only 
slightly deviate from the initial proposals made by the committee, and the final public meeting 
was scheduled after the steering committee completed the final draft of proposed projects.  
NY Rising uses participatory exercises to discursively position its techniques of funding 
as being constituted through the participatory input of residents, hence positioning the funding 
mechanisms as legitimized and inclusive. Other recovery actors make no such distinctions, with 
their funding mechanisms governing the politics of inclusion in discourse and practice. Rather 
than legitimizing their politics of inclusion through participatory exercises, other groups 
managed inclusion by producing and dispersing knowledge of resilience, sustainability, and their 
own funding regimes that served to normalize and legitimize their contentious funding decisions. 
Build It Back’s lengthy applications process and schemes for classifying deserving residents 
produced knowledge of what constitutes un/fundable spaces and residents. Non-governmental 
housing recovery groups adopted the NFIP’s framework for conceptualizing and spreading 
knowledge of risk and resilience, arguing it would be irresponsible to use charitable funds on 
spaces that would be hit with massive NFIP premium rises in the coming years. Through these 
and other techniques, Canarsie recovery actors have normalized and legitimized the choices they 
make in managing their regimes of inclusion. 
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Before breaking for public feedback, the opening speaker made a brief aside that 
signaled the unfolding of tensions. Encouraging anyone interested in “fighting Build It Back” to 
attend different meetings, he warned that this meeting was not for Build It Back-related 
concerns. In response, portions of the crowd began raising their hands and complaining out 
loud. With great effort the crowd was subdued and he assured the crowd that they would be 
directed to more appropriate venues for their Build It Back concerns, emphasizing that it was 
crucial they use their time at this meeting to form a plan for improving community resiliency. At 
the conclusion of the opening presentation, several residents took the pre-emptive gag order on 
reimbursement as their cue to leave. 
 
 
The tense dismissal of Build It Back feedback demonstrated how this participatory event 
was pre-fashioned to facilitate certain participants and types of participation while excluding 
others. Build It Back is the New York City government’s housing recovery and reimbursement 
program, which has been mired in controversy since its inception. In 18 months, the program 
sent just three reimbursement checks and began only six reconstruction programs for its 20,000 
enrolled homeowners (Durkin 2014). As discussed earlier, communication breakdowns between 
the program and intended beneficiaries, the refusal to reimburse low-income residents for their 
rentals during extensive home repairs, and many NGOs’ decisions to exclude residents on the 
lengthy Build It Back waiting list from consideration for funding enhanced the backlash. Further, 
the program requires that all cases in which a house is in foreclosure proceedings should be put 
on hold, a policy some CBO organizers described as “tone-deaf” and “unrealistic” (Interviews 
with ‘Martin’, ‘Tom’). Residents broached their dissatisfaction with reimbursement programs 
several times during the meeting, despite the organizers’ best efforts. Although the material 
results of the meeting would seem to render residents’ objections futile, some local residents 
viewed speaking out against the scripted and exclusive nature of participation as empowering, 
and at the meeting’s close many locals thanked the ‘unruly ones’ for interjecting with the topics 




Towards the end of the meeting the neighborhood’s State Senator Nick Perry rose to 
thank the Governor for including Canarsie in the program, and the residents for their active 
participation. He told residents he was working hard on their Build It Back and insurance-
related concerns, telling the crowd that he will keep pushing for a Sandy loan relief program in 
the New York legislature, “And I’m not talking about welfare, I’m talking about people really in 
need.” After discussing the need for capital projects to address Canarsie’s waterways and 
sewage, he asked how many residents in the room were homeowners. Looking at the scores of 
outstretched hands in front of him, he brought his speech to a close: 
“You are all investors in Canarsie. You have most of your money in a small spot in Canarsie. 
You can’t up and leave, because you have to rebuild to recovery equity in your homes. You’ll 
really have to stay for the reconstruction. And Canarsie’s going to be the place to live, you’re 
going to have flood-resilient homes, and you’re not going to have to worry. Thanks for showing 
that you’re here, you’re a real community, and that Canarsie is going to rise again.”  
After the applause subsided, the GOSR’s regional lead told residents, “What you have 
here is a platform. Tonight, we’re coming together and creating consensus.” Alluding to the 
repeated interruptions from residents, she said that she and committee members would stay after 
the meeting “to make sure everyone fully understands the program.” Residents were reminded of 




State Senator Perry’s speech offers another example of how certain voices and 
perspectives are privileged through participation. Residents were shouted down for distracting 
from the program when attempting to discuss Build It Back and insurance claims, while the State 
Senator’s speech, which focused on those two key issues, earned enthusiasm from the crowd by 
virtue of his pledge to fight for them. The Senator’s discursive construction of a loan relief 
program as being clearly distinct from welfare insofar as it was for “people really in need,” tied 
neoliberal policing of deservingness to the meritocratic march of productive society (Wacquant 
2010). Finally, Senator Perry’s recognition of residents’ need to stay in the neighborhood and 
salvage their equity acknowledged the power of the mortgage to discipline residents’ actions.  
The final list of projects the Canarsie planning committee sent to the GOSR offers 
insights into the way participatory mechanisms seek to ‘create consensus,’ as well as the ways in 
which NY Rising’s techniques governed the in/exclusion spaces and subjects. The final list of 
projects does not address concerns residents raised about mental health or transportation. Rather, 
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it proposes using $7.7 of Canarsie’s $11.9 million to build a flood wall to protect against storm 
surges in Fresh Creek, which forms Canarsie’s northeast border (Bailey 2015). A full project of 
“ecosystem restoration, shoreline stabilization, enhancing community access and protecting 
against the 10-year flood” along Fresh Creek was estimated to cost $60 million, and so the final 
project approved by the committee funds only the construction of cheek walls and bioswales 
along certain low-lying, high-risk areas along Fresh Creek. The Canarsie planning committee 
also proposed million-dollar projects to improve resident and visitor access to Canarsie Pier, as 
well as to build a recovery community center “to coordinate local relief services and supplies 
following a disaster, and provide year-round programming” (Bailey K 2015, NY Rising 
Community Reconstruction Program 2014). One housing recovery organizer suggested to me 
that these recovery center proposals, common amongst recovering Brooklyn neighborhoods, 
were “like the Superdome in Katrina: it’s isolated, it has no infrastructure, it has no electricity, 
and you can’t get anything to it. That’s not where you want people to be.” She suggested the 
focus should be making sure residents can get out of at-risk neighborhoods rather than building a 
place in the neighborhoods for them to converge upon (interview with ‘Shauna’).  
The scarce remaining funds were split between three proposals aiming to produce 
resilience knowledge within the community. The committee proposed spending $150,000 to 
launch Canarsie Corps, “a six-week summer youth job program that identifies and creates paid 
jobs for youth for resiliency and community projects for two years.” $1 million was allocated to 
Resiliency Workforce Development, a project to extend existing workforce training programs 
“and connect Canarsie residents to employment opportunities in a range of resiliency-related 
industries.” Perhaps most compelling was the committee’s $1.5 million proposal to establish a 
program for auditing 100 homes in the community and providing 50 grants to projects “that 
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would enhance resiliency of homes in the 100 year flood-plain.” The GOSR has final say-so on 
these projects, and it will be revealing to see which proposals correspond with the GOSR’s own 
techniques of governing the dispersal of funds. 
The list of proposed projects and the discourses on display throughout the NY Rising 
public meeting provide valuable insights into how resilience is being conceptualized by the 
program. The vast majority of proposed spending target infrastructure improvements such as the 
Fresh Creek floodwall; NY Rising casts resilience as first and foremost an infrastructural project 
of gradually negotiating the relationship between natural processes and the built environment. 
Also notable is the piecemeal nature of this project: regimes of budgeting and cost-benefit 
analyses render the “most resilient” solutions that may be identified (such as the $60 million 
Fresh Creek project) impossible, necessitating compromises. Resilience as imagined and 
propagated by those steering the NY Rising public meeting in Canarsie is primarily concerned 
with using infrastructure to mediate interactions between the environment and human society. 
Public concerns related to Fresh Creek and the sewage systems in the area led to multi-million 
dollar project proposals, yet committee intermediaries repackaged the extensive discussion about 
transportation into a $100,000 proposal for a transportation and parking study, and subsequently 
dropped from consideration.  
While residents may have had alternative interpretations of resilience, the structure of the 
NY Rising participatory mechanisms emphasized geoengineering infrastructure projects while 
downplaying the possibility of using the program’s funds for other causes that may have more 
immediate impact on residents’ everyday lives, such as improving transportation or mental 
health facilities in the neighborhood. NY Rising’s organizers aimed to legitimize the program’s 
politics of inclusion by discursively positioning its funding decisions as the results of inclusive 
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participation. However, this discourse lacked alignment with on-the-ground practices, and the 
structure of NY Rising subordinated participation to calculated neoliberal funding mechanisms. 
Although all recovery actors in Canarsie used funding mechanisms to sort through beneficiaries, 
few took up NY Rising’s elaborate exercise of supposed inclusiveness, and instead legitimized 
their regimes of inclusion by disseminating knowledges of their specific conceptions resilience 
that served to normalize and justify their own funding mechanisms. Understanding how people 
and spaces are in/excluded from projects of resilience shows how inequalities can be replicated 
in the recovery from disasters or the preparations for climate change. 
 
The Resilient Subject, and Entangled Governmentalities 
My interest in Canarsie is not only the resilient governmentalities NY Rising and other 
actors produce, but also the resilient subjects they form. Neoliberal techniques of governance 
work through the establishment of “an enterprise society” in which the individualized and 
responsibilized units of the social fabric are transformed into rational, profit-seeking actors. This 
“enterprise society” mediates subjects’ actions and decisions according to economic rationales 
(Foucault 2008). In disaster recovery, this economic rationale is bound up in discourses of 
resilience and sustainability; the residents who must now make decisions about their homes and 
lives with reference to such concepts are hence transformed into resilient subjects. Neoliberal 
subjects are governed simultaneously by a multiplicity of governmentalities being produced by a 
variety of actors, organizations and institutions. These governmentalities may co-exist, cohere, or 
conflict with each other, opening spaces of rupture for counter-conduct and resistance to 
governance (Ettlinger 2011). In this section I trace prominent governmentalities operating within 
the Canarsie recovery apparatus, as well as the ruptures and unexpected resident practices 
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produced by their articulations. Canarsie residents are the subjects of multiple resilient 
governmentalities whose entangled techniques produce perverse and unexpected effects. 
Through the participatory events it holds, discursive practices it engages in, and physical 
projects it undertakes, NY Rising produces its own governmentality, governable spaces, and 
resilient subjects. As outlined in the previous section, NY Rising’s governmentality stems from a 
conception of resilience as something to be achieved through changes to the critical 
infrastructure of the built environment. The practice of building and funding large capital 
projects is enabled through its funding mechanisms, which engage neoliberal mentalities of 
frugal and calculative governance through the use of cost-benefit analyses. In accordance with 
neoliberal mentalities regarding the need for ‘inclusive’ governance, NY Rising used 
participatory mechanisms to pose the program’s results as emanating from the grassroots 
community. NY Rising’s ideal resilient subjects internalize the scope of possibilities set out by 
the program’s resilient governmentality, according to which risks are best mediated by 
infrastructure projects that have passed through neoliberal tests of feasibility and cost-benefit-
analysis. However, NY Rising’s influence is by no means totalizing or hegemonic. Multiple 
governmentalities co-exist and can govern the same subjects and spaces in ways that can 
supplement or contradict each other (Ettlinger 2011). Recovery funds are partitioned to the point 
where few groups, organizations or programs can responsibly claim to be forming a 
comprehensive recovery plan; the Canarsie planning committee’s half-measure to improve 
resilience along Fresh Creek provides an informative example. The many actors that comprise 
Canarsie’s recovery assemblage each develop their own techniques of governance for connecting 
their specific mentalities of resilience to their targeted governable spaces and subjects.  
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In light of the controversy showcased within the previous vignette, Build It Back’s 
governmentality is worth further attention. Individualized disaster costs typically exceed 
individuals’ savings, leaving residents subservient to recovery organizations that distribute 
funding. Canarsie’s residents in need of housing repairs turned to Build It Back, the city’s 
housing recovery program, for funding, and hence were made subjects of Build It Back’s 
conceptions of risk and resilience, as well as its techniques for classifying residents by 
deservingness and eligibility.  Upon going through the substantial application process, residents 
were placed on lengthy waitlists and prioritized according to numerous criteria, including income 
and risk of future storm damage. 20,000 program applicants waited more than 18 months for the 
first dozen reimbursement checks to be sent out.  As its participants suffered through waitlist 
purgatory for months on end, Build It Back gave over $5 million to inexperienced subcontractors 
for “flawed or incomplete” work, and spent nearly $10 million hiring one of the most expensive 
business consulting firms in the nation (Buettner and Chen 2014). Contrasting the speed with 
which Build It Back’s funding mechanisms dispersed funds to contracting firms as opposed to 
low-income residents indicates that Build It Back’s governmentality is constituted by the 
neoliberal “centaur state” that is liberal and trusting to those at the top while being frugal and 
paternalistic towards those at the bottom (Wacquant 2010). Build It Back produced 
individualized and responsibilized subjects while also marginalizing them through their need for 
outside recovery funds. 
The governmentality produced by the NFIP has also been prominent in Canarsie’s 
recovery, and it demonstrates the instabilities and contingencies through which projects of 
governmentality operate. The NFIP is the federal government’s primary policy tool for 
regulating how Americans will live by the coasts, but its governing mentalities have evolved 
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significantly since its founding in 1968. America’s coastal communities have seen their 
populations explode by 40% since the NFIP’s introduction, forcing the program to evolve 
beyond its original mandate of dealing with routine flooding along the Mississippi River 
(Knowles and Kunreuther 2014). Today, the NFIP aims to govern U.S. residents’ ability to live 
by the coasts by calculating their household’s risk of flooding and charging homeowners 
premiums that are based on those risk calculations. The NFIP’s governmentality thus exemplifies 
numerous features of neoliberal governance through its reliance on specialized forms of 
knowledge and expertise, and its use of calculating and commodifying governing mechanisms. 
All residents with federally-backed mortgages (90% of Canarsie residents) and houses within the 
100-year flood plain are required by law to apply for the NFIP and pay premiums based on flood 
risk. FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers make Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) 
calculating flood risk solely on the basis of structure base-level elevation, with no consideration 
for surrounding infrastructure; “the actuarial tables don’t exist” (interview with ‘Emily’). The 
NFIP’s governmentality entails grounding its formulations and calculations of risk through 
charging premiums to individualized homeowners; it is a financial mode of selecting who can 
live by the coasts. The risks to human populations that live on or near the coasts are governed 
through the mechanism of affordability. 
The NFIP provides an important case of how practices can diverge from policies. The 
NFIP’s policy goals are actualized through such techniques as calculating flood maps and 
requiring homeowners to enroll, yet neither of these techniques is without serious flaws. The 
continuous updating of flood insurance maps “provides the technical underpinning of everything 
the program strives to do,” yet the costly floodplain mapping has been badly underfunded and 
deferred over the years, resulting in a “mismatch between the ambitions of the policy and the 
Paganini 29 
 
knowledge needed to carry it to success” (Knowles and Kunreuther 2014). Meanwhile, low take-
up rates have been a constant of the NFIP despite the legal requirement that all homeowners 
within the 100-year flood plain with federally-backed mortgages own flood insurance. Banks and 
financial institutions are entrusted with enforcing this law, but often chose not to do so because 
they were unlikely to be fined, or failed to do so because the mortgage was transferred to 
financial institutions in parts of the country where flood-hazard risks are not a focus (Knowles 
and Kunreuther 2014).  
Just as the NFIP’s techniques are inundated with gaps, the program’s governing 
mentalities are a site of intense political contestation. The future of the NFIP is mired in ongoing 
uncertainty over the political will to move to fully risk-based premiums, as opposed to the 
subsidized and grandfathered model of the past in which properties built before FIRMs were 
introduced are shielded from risk-based premiums. The debate over moving to fully risk-based 
NFIP premiums is intertwined with regimes of accounting a budgeting that cast the program as 
being in desperate need of changes to nullify its $27 billion debt to the U.S. Treasury. 
Attempting to ‘balance’ the NFIP’s budget, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters flood insurance 
reform law (BW12), immediately eliminating grandfathering and subjecting pre-FIRM properties 
to 25% premium rises per annum until actuarially sound, prompting immediate backlash from 
Congressmen and women from the southeastern United States. Two months after BW12’s 
passage, Hurricane Sandy brought $68 billion of damage to the northeast, prompting the region’s 
representatives to join the fight against BW12. In 2014 Congress passed the Menendez-Grimm 
Flood Insurance Affordability Act (MG14), restoring pre-FIRM properties to grandfathered rates 
for a year before subjecting them to 15-18% per annum increases until premiums reach actuarial 
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levels. But with the deeply-indebted program up for renewal in 2016, its political future remains 
cloudy, and more reforms and delays could be forthcoming.   
The many ruptures within the NFIP’s system of governmentality are particularly deleterious 
because other recovery actors’ techniques are constructed based upon the expectation that the 
NFIP’s techniques work as prescribed. This prompts two crucial points: first, governmentalities 
are relational insofar as they have ‘spillover effects’ on other governmentalities; second, projects 
of governmentality are perpetually imperfect, and the effectiveness of a technique of governance 
can never be assumed. The techniques of governance developed by recovery actors within 
Canarsie’s recovery assemblage are relationally constituted, meaning no single governmentality 
can be analyzed in isolation. For example, the NFIP’s calculations of risk (as being solely based 
on base-level elevation) are influential amongst housing recovery organizations who base their 
formulations of un/sustainable spaces and un/fundable residents on the expectation that NFIP 
premium increases will be a potent force within the neighborhood. CBOs and FBOs focused on 
housing recovery also adopt many Build It Back classification schemes to integrate their efforts 
and avoid overlaps in recovery funding dispersal, and often avoided funding residents who were 
on Build It Back’s waiting list. These decisions caused massive controversy, as Build It Back’s 
funding mechanisms took 18 months to begin sending significant numbers of reimbursement 
checks (Durkin 2014). In Canarsie, recovery actors relationally developed techniques based upon 
assumptions of the effectiveness of other actors’ techniques. Hence, when one actor’s techniques 
were ineffective (NFIP enrollment regulations were not communicated to residents by banks), it 
had knock-on effects upon numerous other governmentalities in the area (residents who had 
never been informed of their need to enroll in the NFIP were excluded from the funding regimes 
of most housing recovery organizations on the basis of their non-compliance.)  In this context, 
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Canarsie residents are best understood as the subjects of entangled governmentalities 
complementing, interfacing with, and contradicting each other.  
The incoherencies and inconsistencies between resilient governmentalities can be traced 
all the way up to the level of mentalities, demonstrated by recovery actors’ differing 
conceptualizations of resilience. NY Rising invites residents to ‘participate’ in planning 
resilience at the broad scale of their neighborhood through infrastructure improvement projects 
chosen outside the bounds of participation, while Build It Back uses multi-year waitlists to 
‘empower’ residents to rebuild their homes with resilience . Meanwhile, NY Rising’s focus on 
infrastructure improvements to mediate risks fails to alleviate the financial burden Canarsie 
residents face, because the NFIP’s calculations of risk do not account for infrastructure. At the 
level of mentalities, the multiple governmentalities within Canarsie’s recovery assemblage found 
coherence in shared neoliberal principles of individualization, responsibilization, 
depoliticization, and the management of inclusion. However, subtle differences in 
conceptualizations of risk and resilience led to incoherencies between different groups’ 
techniques of resilience. Further, the numerous techniques that hinged upon the effectiveness of 
other groups’ techniques often compounded ruptures within both groups’ governmentalities.  
 
Counter-Resilience 
Having discussed at length the incoherencies produced by the confluence of multiple 
resilient governmentalities in Canarsie, it is worth reflecting upon what the recovery apparatus 
does as a whole: marginalize residents by ensnaring them in paradoxical webs of bureaucracy 
from which there appear to be no easy escape routes. Canarsie’s significant Caribbean immigrant 
population, many of whom speak Haitian creole, were largely excluded from Build It Back 
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registration through the program’s problematic management of inclusion (Make the Road New 
York 2014). Two years after Sandy, most residents who did manage to enroll still remain on 
Build It Back’s waitlist, and their enrollment precludes them from securing funds elsewhere. If 
the storm and Canarsie’s pre-storm foreclosure crisis were not enough to financial destabilize 
residents, the need to elevate one’s house or  possibly face up to $10,000 per annum in NFIP 
premiums is poised to displace another batch of residents. In face of this threat of eviction, I 
underscore once again the imperfect nature of governmentality, and the spaces it leaves for a 
micro-politics of resistance. Grove (2014) found that everyday life undermined neoliberal 
disaster management programming in ways that draw out the possibilities for political 
contestation and resistance, while Brassett and Vaughn-Williams (2015) claimed that resilience 
is a political project representing “a series of attempted closures, which are nevertheless always 
already in excess of their own logic and give rise to unexpected, unforeseen, and disruptive 
effects.” Drawing inspiration from Ettlinger’s (2011) insights into how multiple 
governmentalities’ interactions can have perverse effects, and Foucault’s (1996) understanding 
of power as a productive system in which there is always room for resistance and counter-
conduct, I turn now to counter-resilient practices in Canarsie that diverged from the prescribed 
norms of resilience. 
As touched upon in the introduction, the ongoing controversy and debate in Brooklyn’s 
recovery community surrounding basements in the area prompted me to center my research upon 
Canarsie. In the last section, I explained how the Canarsie assemblage’s entangled 
governmentalities have been unresponsive to resident needs, frequently leaving residents in 
paradoxical ‘no-win’ situations. The Canarsie basements controversy is one situation in which 
the entangled governmentalities of disaster recovery have nothing but insecurity to offer 
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residents. Hurricane Sandy flooded basements across Canarsie, leaving some residents without 
the rental income they relied upon to pay their mortgages. Geographers have shown that 
mortgages contain a bundle of techniques of discipline that encourage subjects to self-rule, 
producing a subject who is governable by finance (Kear 2013). Homeowners’ actions are 
persistently disciplined by the need to pay their mortgages (and associated homeownership costs) 
or face displacement. Residents attempted to recover from Sandy with reference to what needed 
to be done to maintain their mortgages; State Senator Perry acknowledged this stark fact in his 
speech at the public meeting, as he mentioned that Canarsie’s homeowners, “investors,” as he 
called them, “can’t up and leave… have to recover the equity in [their] homes.” With the threat 
of displacement looming, residents typically turned to housing recovery groups to secure rebuild 
funding for their basements, only to discover that these organizations had developed funding 
mechanisms that strategically excluded them from recovery funds. 
 Build It Back, FEMA, and most major housing recovery NGOs constructed techniques 
of classification that excluded rental-basements from funding by classifying the spaces in three 
ways: First, as revenue-earning spaces, essentially places of business outside the purview of 
funding allocated for ‘housing,’ a description that excludes the perspective of the recently or 
soon to be evicted renters of Canarsie basements, many of whom are immigrants from the 
Caribbean. Second, as informal spaces, often rental spaces that were cellars according to their 
building codes, and therefore not legal rental units. Third, as counter-resilient spaces, which 
groups identified with reference to anticipated new NFIP flood insurance zones that will subject 
many Canarsians who have never had to buy flood insurance before to NFIP premiums that may 
render their houses unaffordable (see figure 1). Faced with the disciplinary power of their 
mortgages, as well as multiple exclusionary classifications by recovery actors, many residents 
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reconstituted the contested meaning of resilience to fit their pressing material needs, developing 
counter-resilient practices. 
 
Figure 1: Updated FEMA flood maps of Canarsie place ten times more residents in flood zones 
(retrieved from stormrecovery.ny.gov) 
 
 Reasoning they “can’t be resilient if my house is getting foreclosed upon,” residents 
reformulated resilience as a call to self-preservation in their own homes and communities 
(interview with ‘Cheryl’). In the process they eschewed mechanisms of classification in favor of 
counter-resilient practices that would allow them to re-establish their normal lives as quickly as 
possible. Counter-resilient residents used funds from government programs or charitable groups 
towards basement repairs, an illegal use that risks the government clawing back funds. Other 
counter-resilient residents conducted do-it-yourself work against code, thereby rendering their 
basements informal, accepted help from family members, dipped into credit card debt or 
retirement accounts, or defaulted, knowing the foreclosure process can take years to complete. 
Many recovery organizers expect that neighborhood basements will eventually be eliminated 
once NFIP premium rises go into effect and displace the current residents. While I aim to shed 
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light on the perilous position the Canarsie assemblage’s techniques of resilience have produced 
for Canarsie’s counter-resilient residents, I do not cast these residents as victims. Rather, the 
previous discussion of the problems with assuming the effectiveness of any technique suggests 
that the situation in which counter-resilient residents find themselves contains spaces of potential 
rupture and resistance. Further, I claim that their emergent practices engage in the ongoing 
contestation and re-politicization of the entangled resilient governmentalities that stand posed to 
evict them.  
Canarsie’s counter-resilient residents face a paradox, and appear to submerge themselves 
in risks no matter what they do. Eliminating their basements and raising their houses’ elevations, 
something few residents have the spare funds to do, place their houses in line with recovery 
groups’ understandings of resilience and avoids skyrocketing NFIP premiums, but the lost 
basement rental income will eventually result in foreclosure. Regardless of how risk, resilience, 
and sustainability are conceptualized, repairing recently flooded basements in the neighborhood 
surely is a perilous move: another disaster could strike and flood the basements again; the 
government could claw back money if the resident cannot provide receipts indicating they spent 
funds as promised; NFIP changes could eventually jack up premiums to the point where the 
homeowners are driven out. But many counter-resilient homeowners understand the ruptures in 
the NFIP system, have heard a variety of understandings of resilience pushed upon them by a 
number of organizations who are unresponsive to their specified needs, rely upon basement 
rental income to pay their mortgages and retain their largest investments (many of which are 
figuratively underwater), and understand how lengthy the foreclosure process can be. Embedded 
in these contexts, residents’ decisions to take whatever measures necessary to keep their houses 
are emergent adaptations to the resilient governmentalities that exacerbate their financial 
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insecurity. Any number of contingencies, be it a new, better paying job for someone in the 
household, a beneficial NGO program, or a change in unstable NFIP policies, could put these 
families back in the position to salvage equity in their houses in the indeterminate time period 
before one of the aforementioned risks befalls the homeowner. I use the term ‘counter resilience’ 
to refer to those who have recognized the contingent and constructed nature of the conceptions of 
risk, resilience, and sustainability that increasingly are used as mentalities of governance. In 
Canarsie, counter resilient residents took up emergent practices that see them retaining their 
houses and basements in defiance of regimes of environmental governance that are poised to 
evict them in the name of resilience. 
Disaster recovery worker and organizers also take up counter-resilient practices, working 
from their limited positions to expose gaps in the system. Organizers recounted frank 
confrontations with Build It Back officials over the ‘tone-deaf’ nature of its foreclosure policy, 
or worried that the inflexibility of organizations’ rules left the recovery apparatus as a whole 
with an approach that was too top-down to incorporate knowledge of local issues (interviews 
with ‘Tom’ and ‘Emily’). Workers with FBOs and CBOs pointed out that recovery groups too 
often focused on physical resilience while de-emphasizing the social and financial aspects of 
resilience. NY Rising participants similarly practiced counter-resilience by disrupting the 
meeting’s agenda to broach issues that had been excluded from discussion, illuminating the 
narrowly-constructed pathways of the participation that was being solicited and permitted. 
Explaining that climate change made the broad-scale rebuilding of New York City inevitable, 
one counselor at a Canarsie housing organization set the stakes clearly: “Will the rebuild be 
market-driven or policy-driven?  Because if it’s market-driven, Canarsie’s looking at casinos and 
condos. So it will be a question of social justice. How do we decide to live by the coasts? 
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Because we can do it” (interview with ‘Shauna’). Inspired by social justice, counter-resilient 
agents like Shauna engage in the ongoing contestation and re-politicization of projects of disaster 
recovery, resilience and managing life by the coasts in a time of impending climate change.  
 
Conclusion 
The perpetual financial insecurity that is characteristic of neoliberal life renders storm-
impacted populations dependent upon financial assistance from outside actors. These outside 
actors develop methods of strategically distributing funds in the face of an imbalance between 
disaster costs and recovery funds. As I have attempted to highlight, the management of a 
‘politics of inclusion’ is a crucial technique within each group’s own resilient governmentality; 
NY Rising’s discursive performance of participatory governance provided one example of how 
groups legitimize their exclusionary methods.  Groups’ techniques of inclusion were closely 
linked to their respective mentalities regarding what constitutes governing by resilience.  While 
NY Rising sought to build resilience through community-scale infrastructure projects, the NFIP, 
clouded in political uncertainty, works at the scale of individualized property owners to enforce 
its own calculations of risk, which do not account for infrastructure. Meanwhile, Build It Back 
put residents on multi-year waitlists while it lost their paperwork and audited and re-audited their 
claims, simultaneously paying millions of dollars to subcontractors with no experience, typifying 
a program of the neoliberal “centaur state”(Wacquant 2010). Despite these varied approaches to 
governing by resilience, the assorted projects of resilient governmentality are entangled in ways 
that can increase the potency of, or gaps within, techniques of governance. I emphasized this 
entangled aspect of resilient governmentalities through the example of residents who are 
excluded from housing recovery organizations’ funds based upon their statuses on Build It 
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Back’s multi-year waiting list, using this case to argue that groups’ assumptions of the 
effectiveness of other groups’ techniques often compounded the ruptures within resilient 
governmentalites.  
Although I have highlighted the role of entanglements, ruptures, and contingencies in 
projects of resilient governmentality, I emphasize that as a whole the Canarsie recovery 
assemblage’s entangled policies marginalize and evict thousands of residents throughout 
Canarsie and wider Brooklyn. This coherent set of practices is produced as a result of groups’ 
neoliberal mentalities regarding the need to formalize disaster recovery, submit it to regimes of 
budgeting and calculation, and subsequently develop methods for strategically excluding 
residents from recovery funds. Through these neoliberal mentalities, the unquantifiable human 
suffering and peril that is wrought by disasters is to be managed by regimes of financial 
governance that transform the post-disaster space into a plane of knowable, calculable risks.  
Recovery groups attempt to standardize calculable ways of knowing the risks that perpetually 
surround neoliberal subjects; in doing so they overlook to needs and contingencies that 
inevitably arise from the mess that is everyday human practices. These gaps in the management 
of post-disaster life in Canarsie have given rise to a variety of counter-resilient practices. 
Counter-resilient residents interrupted NY Rising participatory exercises in ways that exposed 
the program’s narrow politics of inclusion, while counter-resilient organizers contested the 
neoliberal mentalities driving their and other organizations’ recovery strategies. Finally, 
Canarsie’s counter-resilient residents occupy their homes and retain their basements in defiance 
of a set of entangled resilient governmentalities poised to evict them. Counter-resilience breeds 
performative political acts that illuminate and contest resilient governmentalities’ regimes of 
exclusion, as well as the inequalities and spaces of rupture they produce. Grappling with the 
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spatially and historically contingent nature of the construction and practice of resilient 
governmentalities allows us to understand counter-resilient residents not as victims of a 
totalizing neoliberal regime of resilience but as agents navigating a risk-filled urban environment 
in emergent ways, exposing spaces of rupture and glimpses into the profoundly political and 
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